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DUTY TO INTEGRATE ADMINISTRATORS
legislatures, perhaps with a shove from the courts, might not abolish pre-
hearing attachment and garnishment procedures altogether or at least
limit their use to the "extraordinary situations" referred to in Sniadch.8"
FrED H. MooDY, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Imbalance in Public Schools:
The Affirmative Duty to Integrate Administrators
On May 28, 1968, the Board of Education of Newark, New Jersey
voted to invalidate a promotional list which was formerly the sole criterion
in the appointment of grade-school administrators.1 The action by the
Board of Education admittedly was motivated by a desire to promote
racial balance in the school system.2 The Negro student population in
Newark was 72.5 %, yet there were only two Negroes on the promotional
list.S Moreover, of 249 administrators in the city school system, only
twenty-seven were Negro.4 In lieu of appointments from the list, the
Board of Education appointed seven new grade-school administrators-
six Negro and one white.' As a result, ten white teachers' brought a
suit seeking money damages and injunctive relief under the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 The principal issue raised
" See note 3 supra.
The contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant on Feb-
ruary 1, 1967 reads in part:
The positions of principal, vice principal, head teacher, department chair-
man and counsellor shall be filled in order of numerical ranking from the
appropriate list, which ranking shall be determined by written and oral exam-
ination. Appointments to the position of teacher to assist the principal
(formerly called Administrative Assistant) shall be made annually on a
temporary basis if the Superintendent determines that such a position is
necessary or desirable, and all appointments to such positions shall be made
in order of numerical ranking from the appropriate vice principal's list if
such list exists.
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1256 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W.
3486 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 850).
- Record at 89, 95, 98, Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969).
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1970).
&Id.
Id. at 1256 n.3. Since the purpose in deviating from the list was to promote
racial balance, it is curious that the Board of Education chose to make a white
appointment. No particular reason can be discovered.
'Four of the plaintiffs-Hickey, Dunne, LaRusso, and Chagnon-had taken
only the first of two stages of the examination to qualify for the list when the list
was suspended. 302 F. Supp. at 728 n.1.
742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The provision reads:
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by the complaint was the constitutional limitation on the power of a state
agency to consider color in the selection and promotion of its employees.
The district court in New Jersey dismissed the complaint,' and the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Porcelli v. Titus, affirmed per curiam.0
Several federal court decisions have held that the mandate of Brown
v. Board of Education0 applies not only to the integration of students in
the public schools, but also to the integration of faculties11 within both a
single school and a school system, and of administrators' within a system.
In those cases, however, the courts have reasoned that the duty to integrate
arises upon a showing of past, intentional discrimination. In Porcelli the
dispute arose in the absence of proof of past, intentional discrimination,
and that absence was noted by the district court.' Nevertheless, in Porcelli
the court found a duty to integrate even if the existing imbalance was not
the result of prior discrimination.
It would therefore seem that the Boards of Education have a very
definite duty to integrate school faculties[,] and to permit a great im-
balance in faculties-as obtained on August 22, 1968, when a new plan
was proposed to the school board in Newark for the increasing of
qualified Negro administrators-would be in negation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution and the line of cases which have
followed Brown v. Board of Education .... 14
The question of whether there is a duty in this particular situation is one
of first impression and should be examined.
The public schools, at least since Brown, have been recognized as a
peculiar area of governmental interest, and it follows that decisions in-
volving public schools will focus primarily on the effect of a particular
situation on the schools themselves. This approach finds support in the
following language:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.8 Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969).
9 Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970). On May 4, 1971, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 39 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 850).
10347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1 Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
"See, e.g., Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 429-30 (D.D.C. 1967).
"302 F. Supp. at 736.
14431 F.2d at 1257-58 (emphasis added).
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The public schools were not created, nor are they supported, for the
benefit of the teachers therein, as implied by the contention of the
appellant, but for the benefit of the pupils, and the resulting benefit
to the parents and the community at large.15
Therefore, it is appropriate to direct any examination towards the cases
in the Brown line rather than to the general run of equal employment
cases. 6 Since there have previously been no cases finding a duty to remedy
imbalance among school administrators in the absence of past discrim-
ination, the most pertinent cases are those dealing with the integration of
pupils.
There are numerous opinions indicating that schools need not be
found guilty of intentional racial discrimination before being subject to
a constitutional duty to take affirmative action to relieve the racial im-
balance.1 7 Typical of such decisions are those cases in which the courts
have been asked to resolve disputes arising from systems of neighborhood
schools.18 Perhaps the leading case in which the court found a duty to take
affirmative action is Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee.'9 In
Barksdale, the neighborhoods designated to attend particular schools were,
by chance, divided into black and white. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit agreed with the defendant's contention that the resulting
segregation was unintentional, yet rejected the argument that there was
therefore no duty on the part of the School Committee to correct this segre-
gated school situation. As in Porcelli, it was clear that racial imbalance
did exist, and that it was the ekistence of the imbalance, not the manner
in which it came about, which was constitutionally impermissible. Speak-
ing directly to the point of intentional discrimination, the court noted
that "[e]ducation is tax supported and compulsory, and public school
educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the educational
"5 Bates v. Board of Educ., 139 Cal. 145, 148, 72 P. 907, 908 (1903).
" The major distinction between employment cases which involve schools and
those which do not is that in the school cases the court must consider not only the
parties but also the effect of its decision on the children in the school. In addition,
the history of equal employment legislation shows no anticipation of a situation
such as the one in Porcelli. See Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968).
"
TSee, e.g., Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
8 neighborhood school system is one in which the Board of Education divides
the city into school districts, and the students living within a district must attend
the school within that district.
1 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 348
F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
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system as they arise, and it matters not that the inadequacies are not of
their making."2 Other courts considering the same question have placed
particular emphasis on the public nature of state-supported schools, stress-
ing that they are supported with tax dollars,21 and have couched their
arguments in terms of the impermissibility of tolerating what is clearly
racial imbalance.
22
There is, of course, an opposing point of view on the necessity of
proving past discrimination before arriving at a duty to remedy it.28 This
position, concisely stated, is that if racial imbalance exists by mere chance,
the state is under no duty to remedy it. One of the most articulate explana-
tions of this position is found in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education.24
The court in Deal initially found, as a matter of law, that in the absence
of intentional action on the part of the state the fourteenth amendment
does not afford relief.25 The court went on to hold that
a showing of harm alone is not enough to invoke the remedial powers
of the law. If the state or any of its agencies has not adopted im-
permissible racial criteria in its treatment of individuals, then there
is no violation of the Constitution. If factors outside the schools
operate to deprive some children of some of the existing choices, the
school board is certainly not responsible thereafter 2 6
Although the court in Porcelli failed to discuss any of these competing
considerations, it is evident that the Barksdale position is now accepted by
the third circuit.
Clearly, this position in Deal is irreconcilable with the Barksdale
position. Until the United States Supreme Court chooses to rule on the
subject, the conflict among the circuits is unlikely to be resolved, with
the result that the same suit would succeed in one jurisdiction and fail
in another. Yet it appears that the Barksdale approach finds more support
in recent interpretations of Brozwn. In Kemp v. Beasley, 7 the eight cir-
cuit viewed the courts' role in school integration cases as being unique.
The court in Kemp reasoned that in the normal case the court must balance
2*237 F. Supp. at 544.21 Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
"See, e.g., Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
', 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966).
"Action by a school board, which is a state agency, is state action. Blocker v.
Board of Educ., 226 F.2d 208, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
20369 F.2d at 59.27389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968).
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the conflicting goals of competing parties, but in school integration cases
there is only one goal-a wholly desegregated school system. Those
decisions recognizing the absolute impermissibility of racial imbalance in
schools regardless of how it was achieved more closely reflect the Kemp
position. Indeed, this attitude of looking beyond the parties to the schools
themselves seems to be the thread holding such decisions together.
In Brown, the Supreme Court based its decision largely on the
psychological effects of segregation on the school children involved, par-
ticularly the black children."8 The Court concluded that the adverse
psychological effects on the black children represented a violation of the
fourteenth amendment: the knowledge that they were forced to go to a
school that was only for their race was a serious handicap which the white
children did not have, and the blacks, therefore, were denied the equal
protection of the law. It was this kind of thought that led to the con-
clusion that segregated schools are inherently unequal. A similar argu-
ment can be made regarding the situation in Porcelli. There is ample
psychological data to indicate that black students dealing with only white
people in positions of authority tend to identify all whites with authority.-"
At the same time the black children lose respect for the black male, who
is not seen in such a position of authority.3 The result of this identifica-
tion process is a serious psychological impairment for the black child.
lie loses confidence in his race in general and also in himself.3 ' This
psychological burden, it might be argued, is as serious as the psychological
burden found in Brown, and the same equal protection argument should
apply. Viewing the problem in this way, it becomes evident that the
focus must be on the equal protection of the students, not the admin-
istrators. It is this emphasis, if not this argument, that was recognized in
both Kemp and Barksdale.
If the court in Porcelli found that the school board was under a duty
to promote racial balance in administrative positions, then clearly the
28 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
"' See generaUy H. BOND, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL ORDER (1966); R. COLES, CHILDREN OF CRISIS; A STUDY OF COURAGE AND
FEAR (1967). But see I. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT; SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION, 1954-1966 (1969).
" 
3 M. CRAMER, SOCIAL FACTORS IN EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENT AND ASPIRATIONS
AMONG NEGRO ADOLESCENTS (1966); J. Knight, The Interpersonal Values and
Aspirational Levels of Negro Seniors in Totally Integrated and Segregated South-
ern High Schools 36-40, 65, 1970 (unpublished thesis in Wilson Library, University
of North Carolina).31D. DINKMEYER, READINGS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 394-407 (1965); I.
SARNOFF, PERSONALITY DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENT 85-116 (1962).
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Board of Education was justified in taking appropriate action.82 There
are numerous holdings that the fourteenth amendment forbids the appoint-
ment of teachers, and by inference, administrators, solely on the basis
of race. 3 Yet the court in Porcelli noted that "state action based partly
on considerations of color when color is not used per se, and in furtherance
of a proper governmental objective, is not necessarily a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."3 In Porcelli, the court concluded that the
Newark School Board was acting to promote a proper-indeed, a com-
pelling-governmental interest, and therefore properly considered color.
At least one court, however, in another case involving action by a
board of education to promote racial balance, has noted: "Only if specific
provisions of the Plan do, in fact, discriminate against plaintiffs because
of their race, could it be said to result in an infringement of their con-
stitutional rights." 5 In that case, no discrimination was found; however,
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that in Newark qualified whites were
passed over in favor of qualified blacks. It is in its almost perfunctory
resolution of this tricky problem of "reverse discrimination"8" that the
Porcelli court may well have been the most incisive. For the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit seems to recognize that the constitutional
demands, coupled with the social context in which the situation arose,
outweighed the competing considerations of the plaintiffs' harm. The
court has sensed that the most stringent demands of Brown v. Board of
Education may well fall not on the states and not on the school boards,
but on the white population as a whole. And that demand, as it appears
to be mirrored in Porcelli, is for a constitutional "leap of faith.""7 The
"leap" is a belief that the constitutional and social significance of racial
balance at this time is worth even the harm that may be inflicted in-
cidentally on other members of society.
It is in this regard that Porcelli v. Titus acts to tie together in both
legal and societal terms what should be a major movement in Constitutional
thought-the actual implementation of principles of equality under law.
Yet because so little of this reasoning is explicit, it may well be that
" There is some question as to whether the action by the Board of Education
would have been permissible even if the court in Porcelli had not adopted the
Barksdale position.
" See, e.g., Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).8,431 F.2d at 1257.
8 5Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25, 34 (D.N.J. 1964).
"This is the popular term for those situations in which whites are passed over
in favor of blacks.
a' This term was first used by Kierkegaard in, of course, a religious sense.
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CREDIT CARDS
Porcelli will have little actual impact beyond the third circuit and the
situation as it existed in Newark.
STEPHEN JAY EDEILSTEIN
Consumer Protection-Credit Card Protection Under the
Truth in Lending Act
On October 26, 1970, in response to widespread complaints, Congress
amended1 the Truth in Lending Act to expand consumer protection into
the area of credit cards.2 The legislation outlaws further issuance of un-
solicited credit cards' and imposes stiff criminal penalties for the
fraudulent use of cards to charge more than five thousand dollars.' The
most important provision limits the liability of the consumer for a lost or
'Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 501-03 (Oct. 26, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-64
(Supp. IV, 1965-69).
2The tremendous upsurge in credit cards has brought an increased awareness
of the abuses associated with their use. From Dec. 31, 1967, to June 30, 1969, the
Federal Research Board found that credit outstanding on bank credit cards increased
from 800 million dollars to 1.7 billion dollars. The year-to-year increase on oil
company cards is 200 million dollars. Hearings on S. 721 Before the Subcomr.
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]. The abuses are
more often related to unsolicited cards which (1) have encouraged some consumers
to spend beyond their means possibly to the point of becoming bankrupt, (2) have
been burdensome to some consumers because they were hard to destroy, (3) have
been an unwarranted intrusion into consumers' personal lives, (4) have encouraged
crime because they were easily stolen and quite negotiable, and (5) have had a
potentially inflationary impact upon the economy. Another factor common to all
cards has been the possibility of unlimited liability in the event that the card was
lost or stolen. S. REP. No. 91-739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 S. REP.]. The statistical impact of this last point was measured in
Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21
U. MIAMI L. lRv. 811 (1967).
1 Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 502(a) (Oct. 26, 1970). This provision is far-reaching
because it also concerns renewals of existing credit cards. Renewals can be auto-
matic, i.e., without request by the holder, only if the card had been specifically
requested initially. Unsolicited cards that were issued prior to the act may not be
renewed unless the holder so requests. Id.; 1970 S. EP. 6. What impact will this
have upon the firms who have used both solicited and unsolicited cards in the past
and are unable to distinguish the accounts of holders using solicited cards from those
using unsolicited cards? 1970 S. REP. 13. Another argument of those opposed
to outlawing the unsolicited card is that this prohibition makes it impossible for new
enterprises in the credit card field to get off the ground and compete since the
sending of unsolicited cards is the only practical way to build up a large backlog of
customers. 1969 Hearings 24-26.
'Maximum of ten-thousand-dollar fine and five years in prison. Pub. L. No. 91-
508, § 502(a) (Oct. 26, 1970).
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